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# Oil price pass-through along the price chain in the euro area

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## Abstract

This paper analyzes how oil price shocks are transmitted downstream to producer and consumer prices in the euro area at the highest disaggregate level. In doing so, we first generate an appropriate database that identifies each industrial production sector with its corresponding price of consumer goods for the euro area. We next estimate a constrained vector autoregressive model. Our findings show a statistically significant increase in producer prices after an oil price shock for branches with high oil consumptions, although this statistical pass-through is only partial. However, there is no evidence of a significant oil price pass-through to consumer prices for most branches, which suggests the adaptability of European producers from the most branches to higher oil price pressures without transmitting them to consumers (exceptions: mining, chemical and metal).

**Keywords:** Oil price; Industrial prices; Consumer prices; Disaggregation

## 1 Introduction

There is a large body of research on analyzing production reactions to oil price changes (see, Fukunaga et al. [2010]; Lee and Ni [2002]; Ramcharran [2002]; among others). The theoretical literature states that crude oil is a basic raw material at many production levels and a rise in its price increases production costs, which give rise to a drop in productivity due to the use of a more costly input. Higher costs seem to be insufficient to explain the observed effects of

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oil price fluctuations on production (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford [1996]; Atkeson and Kehoe [1999]) and the related literature has tried to find complementary explanations. Some of these explanations are based on the gradual decline in the share of oil in total gross value added and consumption (see Blanchard and Galí [2010]),<sup>1</sup> the existence of different manufacturing structures or the rigidities in product and labor markets (see, e.g., Blanchard and Galí [2010]; Jiménez-Rodríguez [2008]). Nevertheless, the main effect of an increase in oil price on the industrial production seems to be the fall in domestic demand caused by the cutbacks in consumer expenditures due to lower real and expected incomes. The latter is in line with Davis and Haltiwanger [2001] and Keane and Prasad [1996], who find a fall in wages and employment (at least, in the short run) after an oil price shock. The fall in wages and employment exacerbates the fall in consumer income and thus generates additional reductions in domestic demand. Therefore, the main concern for producers would come from the uncertainty about the depth and duration of an oil price shock and its impact on the future consumer demand, as well as the subsequent reaction of monetary policy. The reactions of consumers and monetary policy are precisely those that most affect the producers and those on which the empirical literature has put more emphasis (see, e.g., Lee and Ni [2002]; Hamilton [2009]; Kilian [2008]; Blanchard and Galí [2010]).

The literature has also analyzed the main mechanisms through which producers make adjustments to deal with an increase in oil prices: (i) producers may transfer higher costs to consumers, which causes an increase in non-energy inflation and a subsequent fall in the demand;<sup>2</sup> (ii) producers may reduce production<sup>3</sup> since they expect that consumers decrease demand for their products and thus reduce their production level in order to prevent the fall in prices; (iii) producers may reduce investment, although the degree of adjustment will depend on the intensity of use of energy in production and the elasticity of substitution by other less energy intensive technologies (see ECB [2010]; Lee and

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<sup>1</sup>For example, Álvarez et al. [2011] show that the share of oil and fuels costs in total economy is only 3.4% in Spain and 2.9% in the euro area. Edelstein and Kilian [2007] indicate that energy share in value added (the sum of nominal value added in oil and gas extraction and imports of petroleum and petroleum products divided by nominal GDP) is 3.3% for the U.S. in 2005.

<sup>2</sup>Lescaroux and Mignon [2008] highlight that such a producers' reaction clearly explains the effects of oil price shocks in the early 1970s, but it is not considered relevant in the shocks of the 2000s for three reasons: the increased credibility of monetary policy, lower indexation wages and higher international competition between companies.

<sup>3</sup>Rotemberg and Woodford [1996] estimate that the reduction in production originated by higher costs is small and can be amplified if companies cannot offset higher production costs by reducing wages. In this line, Keane and Prasad [1996] find that real wages (and employment at the short run) are reduced as a result of an oil price shock. Lee and Ni [2002] suggest that an oil price shock reduces production, planned investment or employment only in oil intensive sectors like oil refining and the chemical industry. Davis and Haltiwanger [2001] also study the effects of oil price shocks on the U.S. industries, especially during the shock of 1973 and the fall in employment on the U.S. automotive sector. In the European countries, Jiménez-Rodríguez [2008] finds that oil price increases have a negative impact on industrial production at the sectoral level.

Ni [2002]);<sup>4</sup> (iv) producer may support technological upgrading to maintain the production level, treating thus an energy shock as a productivity shock;<sup>5</sup> (v) producers may reallocate resources given that changes in consumption patterns induced by an oil price shock can give rise to a sectoral reallocation;<sup>6</sup> and (vi) producers may increase inventories in order to reduce temporarily the supply, assuming that the oil price shock will not be long lasting (see Herrera [2006]).

Despite the fact the large literature on production reactions and producers' adjustments after an oil price shock, there is no study that analyzes the patterns of oil pass-through along the price chain at a disaggregate level. However, this analysis is crucial to forecast consumer prices and so to determine the appropriate monetary policy.

This paper extends the empirical work on oil price impacts by analyzing the oil pass-through along the price chain in the euro area (EA) by using disaggregate data at the industry level.<sup>7</sup> To do so, we have first to generate an appropriate database due to there is no available database that identify industrial production sectors with their corresponding consumer goods at a disaggregate price level. Once we match the industrial production sectors with their corresponding consumer goods at the highest level of disaggregation, we investigate the oil price pass-through in the euro area by considering a pricing chain approach and by analyzing how shocks in oil prices are transmitted downstream to producer and consumer prices.<sup>8</sup>

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 shows the results.

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<sup>4</sup>Bernanke [1983] shows that companies reduce their irreversible investment in durable goods until they are sure of the duration and intensity of the oil price change. More recently, some authors do not find arguments to support the reduction in investment as a result of an oil price shock (see Edelstein and Kilian [2007]).

<sup>5</sup>Atkeson and Kehoe [1999] argue that the product falls in the long term even when the producers adopt less intensive capital and energy technologies. Hamilton [1988] marks, from a flexible pricing model, the appearance of frictional unemployment as workers seek to work in other sectors. The adoption of energy-saving technologies in production is also one of the reasons why Blanchard and Gali [2010] and Bachmeier and Cha [2011] explain the progressive reduction of the effects of the oil price shocks on the non-energy inflation.

<sup>6</sup>Davis and Haltiwanger [2001] argue that technological rigidities or markets do not allow rapid conversion of production and may lead to reduction of an entire industrial sector. This was the case of the automobile industry in the U.S. during the shocks of the 1970s (see Edelstein and Kilian [2009]; Lee and Ni [2002]). Davis and Haltiwanger [2001] study the effects on sectoral employment and show that an oil price shock increases job losses and reduces its creation after four months of the shock, with a negligible effect after 2 years, but with the reallocation of employment.

<sup>7</sup>Authors such as Herrera et al. [2011] and Jiménez-Rodríguez [2008] have highlighted the relevance of a disaggregated analysis of the industrial production.

<sup>8</sup>The pricing chain approach has been previously used by authors such as Ferrucci et al. [2012]

## 2 Data

We use monthly disaggregate EA<sup>9</sup> data at the industry level on producer price index ( $ppi_t$ )<sup>10</sup> and the Harmonised index of consumer price ( $hicp_t$ ), as well as the nominal Brent price in € ( $poil_t$ ). The longest available sample period for disaggregate data runs from January 2000 to August 2015. The producer and consumer price data are downloaded from the Eurostat database (<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>). The nominal oil price data in US dollars and the US dollar to euro exchange rate data come from US Energy Information Administration (<http://www.eia.gov>) and European Central Bank (<http://www.ecb.europa.eu>), respectively.

As pointed out previously, there is no available database that identify industrial production sectors with their corresponding consumer goods at a disaggregate price level. Thus, we make a correspondence between the industrial production sectors and consumer prices. We first identify 31 industrial branches (from the NACE, Revision 2 classification)<sup>11</sup> that use oil in support of its primary activities according to the international methodology for oil statistics.<sup>12</sup> Among these industrial branches, there are only nineteen related to the supplies or direct production of 49 consumer goods which are identified according to COICOP/HICP classification.<sup>13</sup> Thus, we obtain for each producer price index an equivalent group of Harmonised index of consumer price by aggregating all the related consumer price indices with their corresponding weights (see Appendix).<sup>14</sup> For clarification purposes, we next show how we have made the match between the industrial production sectors and consumer prices for one particular industrial branch. The industrial branch named *Manufacture of wearing apparel* (NACE rev. 2 code 14) is dedicated to the production of two consumer goods: *Garments* and *Other articles of clothing and clothing acces-*

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<sup>9</sup>Euro area refers to EA-18, which consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia.

<sup>10</sup>Eurostat indicates that “producer price index shows the development of transaction prices for the monthly industrial output of economic activities. Overall, it measures the average price development of all goods and related services on both the domestic and the non-domestic markets, at all processing stages”.

<sup>11</sup>The statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community, abbreviated as NACE, is the classification of economic activities in the European Union.

<sup>12</sup>In oil statistics, oil is used in transformation sector (quantities of oil transformed into another energy form, i.e. generation of electricity and heat), energy sector (oil consumed by the energy sector to support the extraction or plant operation of transformation activities) and total final consumption (transport, industry and other sectors). Consequently, we use total final consumption in industry, excluding the use of oil in other sectors, and therefore we do not take into account costs generated for providing consumer goods and services, as transport. See, for example, the methodology in <http://www.iea.org>.

<sup>13</sup>The COICOP/HICP is the United Nations Classification of individual consumption by purpose (COICOP), which was adapted to the compilation of the Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) of the European Union and the euro area.

<sup>14</sup>We use the annual weights for each COICOP/HICP item from 2000 to 2014 published by Eurostat. The information used by Eurostat to calculate the weight of each product group is collected mainly by means of household budget surveys and therefore is representative for the average household consumption expenditure. See methodology in <https://www.ecb.europa.eu>.

sories (COICOP/HICP codes 03.1.2 and 03.1.3, respectively). Therefore, the producer price index for *Manufacture of wearing apparel* is matching with the consumer price index obtained from the weighted aggregation of the corresponding two consumer price indices (*Garments* and *Other articles of clothing and clothing accessories*).<sup>15</sup>

Once we match the industrial production sectors with their corresponding consumer goods, we analyze the seasonal and non-stationary behaviour of the log transformed indices. Table 1 shows the main results for producer and consumer prices. We observe that most of the producer and consumer price indices display seasonality and, consequently, we have performed a seasonal adjustment procedure using the TRAMO-SEATS.<sup>16</sup> On the contrary,  $poil_t$  does not show seasonal fluctuations.

Once the producer and consumer price indices have been seasonally adjusted, we investigate the stationarity of the log levels by using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, whose the null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root. We cannot reject the null hypothesis for oil prices (not shown in the table)<sup>17</sup>, eighteen producer price indices and seventeen consumer price indices (see Table 1). Despite the fact there is one producer price and two consumer prices in which stationarity in the log-levels is found, we have decided to do the first log-differences for all indices for interpretation purposes.

Table 1: Seasonal adjustment and unit root test.

$b$	branch	Producer price index, $ppi_t^b$			Consumer price index, $hicp_t^b$		
		log-level	$\Delta$		log-level	$\Delta$	
1	mining	SA	0.30	-7.41 ***	SA	1.06	-7.38 ***
2	food		-2.45	-4.11 ***	SA	-1.95	-6.86 ***
3	beverages	SA	-1.51	-7.47 ***	SA	-1.25	-4.90 ***
4	tobacco	SA	-1.64	-10.67 ***		-0.71	-9.31 ***
5	textile	SA	-1.03	-5.07 ***	SA	-1.64	-12.04 ***
6	apparel	SA	-1.76	-8.01 ***	SA	-5.13 ***	-13.56 ***
7	leather	SA	-0.68	-7.95 ***	SA	0.05	-8.26 ***
8	wood		-1.79	-4.80 ***	SA	1.36	-6.18 ***
9	paper		-2.74	-4.53 ***	SA	-0.52	-5.78 ***
10	recorded		-4.20 ***	-8.66 ***	SA	-1.66	-5.43 ***
11	chemical	SA	-2.36	-6.54 ***	SA	-2.04	-8.84 ***
12	non-metallic	SA	0.16	-4.49 ***	SA	1.08	-3.36 ***
13	basic metals		-1.50	-4.67 ***		-0.86	-4.71 ***
14	metal	SA	-0.06	-4.84 ***	SA	-0.36	-5.02 ***
15	electronic		1.43	-8.10 ***	SA	-1.17	-6.08 ***
16	electrical	SA	-1.09	-4.79 ***	SA	-0.77	-5.90 ***
17	machinery	SA	-0.88	-7.49 ***	SA	-3.64 **	-6.24 ***
18	motor		-3.09	-9.62 ***	SA	-1.28	-7.70 ***
19	transport		-2.75	-13.64 ***	SA	0.41	-5.77 ***

**Note:** Seasonal adjustment (SA) series and ADF test statistics for log-levels and 1st log-differences ( $\Delta$ ) of each branch  $b$ . The null hypothesis is that a unit root exists.

One/two/three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

We now investigate whether the past values of oil price changes help predict

<sup>15</sup>See details in the Appendix.

<sup>16</sup>We implement the multi processing seasonal adjustment with JDemetra+, available at European Statistical System (<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/>).

<sup>17</sup>The  $p$ -values of ADF test for oil prices are 0.59 and 0.01 for the log-levels and the first log-differences of oil prices, respectively.

the value of the changes in the producer price index of branch  $b$ :

$$\Delta ppi_t^b = c^{b,1} + \sum_{j=1}^p \alpha_j^1 \Delta ppi_{t-j}^b + \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j^1 \Delta poil_{t-j} + \mu_t^{b,1} \quad (1)$$

We also test whether changes in the producer price index of branch  $b$  help predict changes in the consumer price index of branch  $b$ :

$$\Delta hicp_t^b = c^{b,2} + \sum_{j=1}^p \alpha_j^2 \Delta hicp_{t-j}^b + \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j^2 \Delta ppi_{t-j}^b + \mu_t^{b,2} \quad (2)$$

where  $p = 1, 2, \dots, 24$  and  $b = 1, 2, \dots, 19$  branches. We use an  $F$ -statistics to test for the null hypothesis that  $\beta_1^k = \beta_2^k = \dots \beta_p^k = 0$  with  $k = 1, 2$ .

Instead of evaluating the Granger-causality (G-causality) test for a convenient  $p$  lag, we take into account the Hamilton and Herrera [2004]’s warning about the convenience of including a rich lag structure in studying the effects of oil prices on macroeconomic variables. Then, we investigate the sensitive of the G-causality test to the choice of lag length  $p = 1, 2, \dots, 24$ , obtaining their corresponding  $p$ -values.

Figure 1 indicates that oil price changes G-cause industrial price changes (at least, for some lag) in ten out of nineteen branches. As expected, G-causality is found for the industrial sectors with the highest oil consumption (see Figure 2).<sup>18</sup> We find that evidence of G-causality when more than 12 lags are included for the branch 12, the *non-metallic* branch (the branch with the highest relative consumption of oil). We also obtain that oil price changes help predict the branch 11 (the *chemical* branch) for any lag. In contrast, we do not find G-causality at any lag for branches with the lowest consumption of oil (*wood* branch,  $b=8$ ).

Figure 3 shows that industrial price changes G-cause consumer price changes in most of branches (12 out of 19) for, at least, some lag.

Therefore, G-causality test provides evidence of causality running from oil prices to producer prices and from producer to consumer prices, thereby supporting the chosen modeling strategy (the pricing chain approach).

### 3 The Model

It is our aim to analyze the oil pass-through along the price chain in the EA at disaggregate level. To do so, we consider a  $p$ th-order VAR for each branch  $b$

<sup>18</sup>There are no data of final consumption in total petroleum products that perfectly coincide with the branches used in this paper. Thus, we have done a correspondence between the branches of this paper and the industrial sectors for which there are data of final consumption in total petroleum products. Specifically, we have used the following identification: *Non-Metallic Minerals*=branch 12; *Chemical and Petrochemical Products*=branch 11; *Food and Tobacco*=branches 2, 3, 4; *Machinery*=branches 15, 16, 17; *Iron and Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals*=branch 13; *Mining*=branch 1; *Paper, Pulp and Print*=branches 9, 10; *Textile and Leather*=branches 13, 14, 15; *Transport Equipment*=branches 18, 19; and *Wood and Wood Products*=branch 8.




Figure 1: G-causality test ( $H_0 : poi_t$  does not G-cause  $ppi_t^b$ )





Figure 2: Final consumption in total petroleum products by industrial sectors.





Note: This Figure presents the p-values for G-causality test for  $b=1,2,\dots,19$  branches and  $p=1,2,\dots,24$  lags. p-values  $< 0.05$  (bottom shaded area in red) rejects the null hypothesis that  $ppi_t^b$  does not G-cause  $hicp_t^b$ .

Figure 3: G-causality test ( $H_0 : ppi_t^b$  does not G-cause  $hicp_t^b$ ).

with oil price changes ( $\Delta poi_t$ ), changes in the producer price index ( $\Delta ppi_t^b$ ) and changes in the consumer price index ( $\Delta hicp_t^b$ ) as variables. Thus, the reduced form of VAR(p) is written as

$$Y_t = a + \sum_{j=1}^p \Phi(p) Y_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t \quad (3)$$

for each branch, with  $Y_t = (\Delta poi_t, \Delta ppi_t^b, \Delta hicp_t^b)$  and with  $\varepsilon_t$  being a generalization of a white noise process with variance-covariance matrix  $\Omega$ .

Although it is common in the literature on the effects of oil prices to consider oil prices as endogenous variable (see, e.g., Kilian [2008]), the use of disaggregated data in a region like the euro area previously required test for whether domestic disaggregated prices cause oil prices. Thus, we apply a block-exogeneity test with the null hypothesis that oil price changes are not Granger-caused by changes in the producer price index and the harmonized index of consumer price

of the branch  $b$ . Table 2<sup>19</sup> shows that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all branches but for *food* ( $b = 2$ ) and *basic metals* ( $b = 13$ ). Consequently, we consider a VAR(p) in which we do not allow that domestic price variables affect oil price changes for all branches but *food* and *basic metals* (given the results of the block-exogeneity test), but we allow the latter variable affects the former variables.

Thus, we estimate the following VAR(p) model:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \Delta poil_t \\ \Delta ppi_t^b \\ \Delta hicp_t^b \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 \\ a_2 \\ a_3 \end{pmatrix} + \sum_{j=1}^p \begin{pmatrix} \phi_{11}^{(j)} & \phi_{12}^{(j)} & \phi_{13}^{(j)} \\ \phi_{21}^{(j)} & \phi_{22}^{(j)} & \phi_{23}^{(j)} \\ \phi_{31}^{(j)} & \phi_{32}^{(j)} & \phi_{33}^{(j)} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \Delta poil_{t-j} \\ \Delta ppi_{t-j}^b \\ \Delta hicp_{t-j}^b \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_{1t} \\ \varepsilon_{2t} \\ \varepsilon_{3t} \end{pmatrix} \quad (4)$$

with  $\phi_{12}^{(j)}$  and  $\phi_{13}^{(j)}$  being zero for all  $j$  and for all branches but *food* and *basic metals*.

We estimate by maximum likelihood, with the optimal lag length chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion with an upper bound of 12 lags and a lower bound of 1 lag. Moreover, shocks are identified by means of a standard Cholesky decomposition with the variables ordered as follows:  $\Delta poil_t$ ,  $\Delta ppi_t^b$  and  $\Delta hicp_t^b$ . We obtain the impulse responses to an oil price shock and their corresponding 90%, 95% and 99% confidence bands calculate by means of a bootstrapping procedure.<sup>20</sup>

## 4 Results

This section presents the accumulated impulse responses to a 1% oil price shock, which come from a constrained VAR(p) for all branches except *food* and *basic metals*, in which an unrestricted VAR(p) model is used. Table 3 shows the accumulated responses of producer price index of branch  $b$  (in percentages) to a 1% oil price shock. For the sake of conciseness, we show the accumulated responses in quarters rather than months. We observe that an increase in oil prices leads to higher industrial production prices for most of branch, which

<sup>19</sup>The VAR(p) can be written as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta poil_t &= a_1 + B'_1 x_{1t} + B'_2 x_{2t}^{(b)} + \varepsilon_{1t} \\ x_{2t}^{(b)} &= a_2 + D'_1 x_{1t} + D'_2 x_{2t}^{(b)} + \varepsilon_{2t} \end{aligned}$$

where  $x_{1t}$  contains lags of  $\Delta poil_t$  and  $x_{2t}^{(b)}$  is a vector  $(2 \cdot p \times 1)$  vector containing lags of changes in the producer price index ( $\Delta ppi_t^b$ ) and the harmonized index of consumer price of branch  $b$  ( $\Delta hicp_t^b$ ). We use the following test statistic to test for whether  $\Delta ppi_t^b$  and  $\Delta hicp_t^b$  Granger-cause  $\Delta poil_t$  (i.e.,  $B_2 = 0$ ):

$$T \times \{\log |\sigma^2(0)| - \log |\sigma^2|\} \stackrel{L}{\sim} \chi^2(2p)$$

where  $\sigma^2$  is the variance of the residuals from OLS estimation of (3) and  $\sigma^2(0)$  that of the residuals from OLS estimation of model (3) when  $B_2 = 0$ .

<sup>20</sup>We apply the Efron bootstrap percentile confidence interval with 2500 draws.

Table 2: Block exogeneity test.

	branch	lags	statistic		p-value
1	mining	3	1.1917		0.3091
2	food	2	2.7595	**	0.0272
3	beverages	2	0.7856		0.5348
4	tobacco	1	1.3354		0.2639
5	textile	8	1.1145		0.3380
6	apparel	4	0.4044		0.9181
7	leather	6	0.8512		0.5974
8	wood	4	0.3738		0.9344
9	paper	4	1.0621		0.3884
10	recorded	3	0.1533		0.9884
11	chemical	1	2.2281		0.1087
12	non-metallic	12	0.4536		0.9888
13	basic metals	3	2.5346	**	0.0199
14	metal	6	1.3386		0.1927
15	electronic	6	1.5454		0.1044
16	electrical	5	0.9199		0.5144
17	machinery	2	1.3261		0.2590
18	motor	1	0.052		0.9494
19	transport	7	1.1817		0.2857

**Note:** One/two/three asterisks mean a  $p$ -value less than 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

is consistent with a natural subsequent increase in industrial costs given that crude oil has been a basic input to production, and that oil price pass-through to producer prices is not complete. However, the patterns of pass-through from oil prices to producer prices differ across branches. The branches with higher oil consumptions (see Figure 2) are those in which the impact of an oil shock is statistically significant (*mining*, *food*, *paper*, *chemical*, *non-metallic metals*, *basic metals*, *metal* and *electrical*). In particular, the *basic metals* and *chemical* branches (which show very high oil consumptions) have the largest significant accumulated effects, with an impact of 0.18% and 0.13% after one year, respectively. Therefore, it seems that there is a link between oil consumption and accumulated responses shown in Table 3. The branches with the highest oil consumption (*non-metallic*, *chemical* and *basic metals*) show significantly high responses to oil price shocks and those with the lowest oil consumption (*wood*, *motor* and *transport*) do not response significantly to oil shocks. Therefore, an oil price shock seems to increase industrial costs according to the intensity of final consumption of oil.

We are also interested to assess the transmission of higher oil prices to consumer prices. Table 4 shows the accumulated responses of consumer prices of branch  $b$  to a 1% increase in oil prices. We observe that an unanticipated oil price increase leads to a statistically significant increase in consumer prices for only three branches (*mining*, *chemical* and *metal*). These three branches also have significant responses of producer prices to an oil price shock, but there are

Table 3: Accumulated impulse responses of producer price index (in percentages) attributed to a 1% oil price shock.

	branch	lags	quarter 1		quarter 2		quarter 3		quarter 4	
1	mining	3	0.0051		0.0107	*	0.0143	**	0.0162	**
2	food	2	0.0179	**	0.0289	**	0.0348	**	0.0381	**
3	beverages	2	0.004		0.0049		0.0054		0.0057	
4	tobacco	1	-0.0027		-0.0028		-0.0028		-0.0028	
5	textile	8	0.0043		0.0084		0.0115		0.014	
6	apparel	4	0.0022		-0.0009		-0.0022		-0.0026	
7	leather	6	0.0037		0.0049		0.0134		0.0148	
8	wood	4	0.0039		0.0123		0.0175		0.0208	
9	paper	4	0.0124	**	0.0317	***	0.0395	**	0.0435	***
10	recorded	3	0.002		0.0026		0.003		0.0033	
11	chemical	1	0.0979	***	0.1279	***	0.1312	***	0.1315	***
12	non-metallic	12	0.0066	***	0.0122	***	0.0182	***	0.0256	***
13	basic metals	3	0.1047	***	0.1684	***	0.1816	***	0.1767	***
14	metal	6	0.008	*	0.0189	**	0.0277	**	0.0295	**
15	electronic	6	-0.0078		-0.017		-0.0316		-0.0328	
16	electrical	5	0.003	**	0.0048	*	0.0065	*	0.0079	*
17	machinery	2	0.0002		0.0002		0.0002		0.0002	
18	motor	1	0.0035		0.0036		0.0036		0.0036	
19	transport	7	0.0023		0.0009		-0.0014		-0.0035	

**Note:** Responses come from a constrained VAR(p) for all branches except *food* and *basic metals*, in which an unrestricted VAR(p) model is used. The optimal lag length chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion. For conciseness, only the quarterly aggregations of impulse responses are reported in the table. One/two/three asterisks mean a  $p$ -value (calculated by bootstrapping procedure) less than 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

five branches with a significant impact of oil prices on producer prices (*food*, *paper*, *non-metallic*, *basic metals* and *electrical*) that not show a significant response of consumer prices to an oil shock. The impact of an oil price shock on producer prices is quantitatively similar to the one on consumer prices for *mining* and *chemical*, which seems to indicate that the pass-through from producer prices to consumer prices is complete. This is not the case for *metals*, where the pass-through is partial. Therefore, it seems that most of the increase in the production costs driven by an oil price shock does not transfer into inflation (with the exceptions previously highlighted).

In short, we have found evidence that an increase in oil prices leads to higher producer prices for branches with high levels of oil consumption, in line with other studies (see e.g., Fukunaga et al. [2010]; Lee and Ni [2002]).<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, even in the highest oil-intensive branch (*basic metals*), industrial prices only increase 0.17% after one year of an unanticipated oil price increase. This

<sup>21</sup>Fukunaga et al. [2010] suggest shifts in the oil price driven by either of the two oil demand shocks (global or oil-specific demand) cause an increase in most industrial prices in the US and Japan. Lee and Ni [2002] show in a VAR model that oil price shocks reduce the supply of oil-intensive industries in the US (*petroleum refinery* and *industrial chemical*).

Table 4: Accumulated impulse responses of consumer price index (in percentages) attributed to a 1% oil price shock

	branch	lags	quarter 1	quarter 2	quarter 3	quarter 4
1	mining	3	0.0053	0.0106 *	0.0132 *	0.0146 *
2	food	2	-0.0063	-0.002	0.001	0.0027
3	beverages	2	0.0011	0.0022	0.0027	0.003
4	tobacco	1	0.0032	0.003	0.003	0.003
5	textile	8	-0.0013	-0.0015	-0.001	-0.0005
6	apparel	4	-0.0034	-0.0009	-0.003	-0.0026
7	leather	6	0.0007	0.0024	0.0044	0.006
8	wood	4	-0.0021	-0.0032	-0.0036	-0.0037
9	paper	4	-0.0025	-0.0041	-0.0038	-0.0031
10	recorded	3	-0.0025	-0.0043	-0.005	-0.0053
11	chemical	1	0.1421 ***	0.1407 ***	0.1404 ***	0.1403 ***
12	non-metallic	12	-0.0004	-0.0003	0.0006	0.0029
13	basic metals	3	0.0011	0.0035	0.0061	0.008
14	metal	6	0.0032	0.0177 ***	0.0339 ***	0.0435 ***
15	electronic	6	-0.0018	-0.006	-0.0052	-0.0059
16	electrical	5	0.0008	-0.0001	0.0003	0.0008
17	machinery	2	-0.0013	-0.0014	-0.0014	-0.0014
18	motor	1	0.0014	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015
19	transport	7	0.0004	-0.0004	0.0005	0.0007

**Note:** Responses come from a constrained VAR(p) for all branches except *food* and *basic metals*, in which an unrestricted VAR(p) model is used. The optimal lag length chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion. For conciseness, only the quarterly aggregations of impulse responses are reported in the table. One/two/three asterisks mean a *p*-value (calculated by bootstrapping procedure) less than 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

relatively low pass-through can be explained by the fact that main energy source for industries seems not to be nowadays crude oil, but electricity and the gas.<sup>22</sup>

In contrast, there is no clear evidence about the transmission of such highest industrial prices to inflation at disaggregate level. The only exceptions to this are the *mining*, *chemical* and *metal* branches, in which there is a significant transmission of prices in the channel oil-industry-consumption. These findings seem to confirm the results of other studies such as Álvarez et al. [2011], who show that this indirect transmission channel is limited. This lack of transmission would depend on the capacity of the producers to offset the higher costs through changes in production, investments, inventories, or through sectoral reallocation or technological upgrading.

<sup>22</sup>In the euro area (19 countries), gas makes up for 35.1% of final energy consumption, electrical energy 31%, solid fuels 11.5% and total petroleum products only 9.5%. In the US, electricity makes up 40.3% of energy use, natural gas 14.5%, unleaded gasoline 14%, diesel fuel 11.4% and jet fuel 9.7% (Kilian [2008]).

## 5 Conclusions

The study of the transmission channels through which oil price changes affect macroeconomic variables is, in general, an interesting issue to better understand the consequences of oil price shocks and to design the optimal monetary policy for counteracting such effects. In particular, the analysis of how oil price shocks are transmitted downstream to producer and consumer prices at industrial level may be determinant for the design of such a policy.

This paper finds evidence of a partial oil price pass-through to producer prices for the branches with higher oil consumption and a negligible pass-through for the other branches. This result may be explained by the fact that crude oil has reduced its importance as a main energy source for the industries over the last two decades. Moreover, oil price pass-through to consumer prices is very low in general and is only relevant for three branches (*mining*, *chemical* and *metal*). Therefore, we show evidence of some capacity of producers to adjust their production plans to changes in costs for most of the analyzed industrial branches, avoiding pass-through to consumer inflation. This is not the case for mining and chemical, where the pass-through from producer to consumer prices after an oil price shock seems to be complete. Also, there is a partial transmission for metals.

The literature has found that oil price shocks reduce industrial production (see, e.g., Jiménez-Rodríguez [2008]), although the effects for each industry depend on the origin of the oil price changes (see, e.g., Fukunaga et al. [2010]). This paper sheds light on the possible explanations for the fall in the industrial production observed after an oil price shock in the related literature. This industrial production fall may be explained by the increase in producer prices (mainly for branches with higher oil consumption) after the oil shock and also by the adjustment in the production level for avoiding the transmission of higher costs to consumer prices.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, the design of the monetary policy reaction in the euro area should consider the fact that inflation risks do not seem to arise from supply shocks, but from the demand shocks.

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<sup>23</sup>There are many factors that have been an important role in this adjustment. Some of these factors are the lower use of petroleum products in industrial production, technological innovations reducing industrial costs and the direct decision of producers in order to prevent the fall in the prices originated from the likely drop in future consumer demand.

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## 6 Appendix

	branch	NACE rev.2		COICOP/HICP	weights*
1	mining	8	Other mining and quarrying	0454 Solid fuels	0.151
2	food	10	Manufacture of food products	0111 Bread and cereals 0112 Meat 0113 Fish and seafood 0114 Milk, cheese and eggs 0115 Oils and fats 0116 Fruit 0117 Vegetables 0118 Sugar, jam, honey, chocolate and confectionery 0119 Food products n.e.c. 0121 Coffee, tea and cocoa	2.603 3.606 1.076 2.223 0.436 1.185 1.575 0.940 0.517 0.458
3	beverages	11	Manufacture of beverages	0122 Mineral waters, soft drinks, fruit and vegetable juices 0211 Spirits 0212 Wine 0213 Beer	0.920 0.327 0.781 0.592
4	tobacco	12	Manufacture tobacco products	022 Tobacco	2.374
5	textiles		Manufacture of textiles	0311 Clothing materials 0312 Garments 0313 Other articles of clothing and clothing accessories 0511 Furniture and furnishings 0512 Carpets and other floor coverings 052 Household textiles 0561 Non-durable household goods 0932 Equipment for sport, camping and open-air recreation	0.035 4.518 0.213 1.921 0.125 0.457 1.021 0.261
6	apparel	14	Manufacture of wearing apparel	0312 Garments 0313 Other articles of clothing and clothing accessories	4.518 0.213
7	leather	15	Manufacture of leather and related products	032 Footwear 0431 Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling 052 Household textiles 054 Glassware, tableware, household utensils 0561 Non-durable household goods 0712 Motor cycles, bicycles and animal drawn vehicles 0714 0932 Equipment for sport, camping and open-air recreation 1231 Jewellery, clocks and watches	1.222 0.419 0.457 0.528 1.021 0.282  0.261 0.463

**Note:** \*We use the annual weights for each COICOP/HICP item from 2000 to 2014 published by Eurostat. To save space, we only report here the last available weights (2014 HICP basket).

branch	NACE rev.2	COICOP/HICP	weights*
8	wood	16	Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
		0431	Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling
		0511	Furniture and furnishings
		052	Household textiles
		054	Glassware, tableware, household utensils
		055	Tools and equipment, house and garden
9	paper	17	Manufacture of paper and paper products
		0431	Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling
		0561	Non-durable household goods
		0931	Games, toys and hobbies
		0953	Miscellaneous printed matter; stationery and drawing materials
		_0954	
10	recorded	8	Printing and reproduction recorded media
		0953	Miscellaneous printed matter; stationery and drawing materials
		_0954	
11	chemical	20	Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
		0431	Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling
		0561	Non-durable household goods
		0722	Fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment
		0914	Recording media
		0931	Games, toys and hobbies
		0933	Gardens, plants and flowers
		0953	Miscellaneous printed matter; stationery and drawing materials
		_0954	
		1212	Electrical appliances for personal care; other appliances, articles and products for personal care
		_1213	
12	non-metallic	23	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
		0431	Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling
		0511	Furniture and furnishings
		0531	Major household appliances
		_0532	whether electric or not and small electric household appliances
		054	Glassware, tableware, household utensils
		1232	Other personal effects
13	basic metals	24	Manufacture of basic metals
		0561	Non-durable household goods

**Note:** \*We use the annual weights for each COICOP/HICP item from 2000 to 2014 published by Eurostat. To save space, we only report here the last available weights (2014 HICP basket).

branch	NACE rev.2	COICOP/HICP	weights*
14	metal	25	Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
		0313	Other articles of clothing and clothing accessories
		0431	Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling
		0452	Gas
		0511	Furniture and furnishings
		0531	Major household appliances
		.0532	whether electric or not and small electric household appliances
		054	Glassware, tableware, household utensils
		055	Tools and equipment, house and garden
		0561	Non-durable household goods
		0931	Games, toys and hobbies
		0932	Equipment for sport, camping and open-air recreation
		0953	Miscellaneous printed matter; stationery and drawing materials
		1212	Electrical appliances for personal care; other appliances, articles and products for personal care
		.1213	
15	electronic	26	Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
		055	Tools and equipment, house and garden
		0721	Spare parts and accessories for personal transport equipment
		0820	Telephone and telefax equipment
		0911	Equipment for the reception, recording and reproduction of sound and picture
		0912	Photographic and cinematographic equipment and optical instruments
		0913	Information processing equipment
		0914	Recording media
		0931	Games, toys and hobbies
		0953	Miscellaneous printed matter; stationery and drawing materials
		.0954	
		1231	Jewellery, clocks and watches
		1232	Other personal effects
16	electrical	27	Manufacture of electrical equipment
		0511	Furniture and furnishings
		0531	Major household appliances
		.0532	whether electric or not and small electric household appliances
		055	Tools and equipment, use and garden
		0721	Spare parts and accessories for personal transport equipment
		0911	Equipment for the reception, recording and reproduction of sound and picture
		0931	Games, toys and hobbies

**Note:** \*We use the annual weights for each COICOP/HICP item from 2000 to 2014 published by Eurostat. To save space, we only report here the last available weights (2014 HICP basket).

	branch	NACE rev.2		COICOP/HICP	weights*
17	machinery	28	Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.	0531 Major household appliances .0532 whether electric or not and small electric household appliances 054 Glassware, tableware, household utensils 055 Tools and equipment, use and garden 0721 Spare parts and accessories for personal transport equipment 0913 Information processing equipment 0921 Major durables for indoor and outdoor recreation including musical instruments .0922	0.891  0.528 0.468 0.554 0.494 0.293
18	motor	29	Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers	0511 Furniture and furnishings 0711 Motor cars 0712 Motor cycles, bicycles and .0714 animal drawn vehicles 0721 Spare parts and accessories for personal transport equipment 0921 Major durables for indoor and outdoor recreation including musical instruments .0922	1.921 3.162 0.282  0.554 0.293
19	transport	30	Manufacture of other transport equipment	0712 Motor cycles, bicycles and .0714 animal drawn vehicles 0721 Spare parts and accessories for personal transport equipment 0921 Major durables for indoor and outdoor recreation including musical instruments 0932 Equipment for sport, camping and open-air recreation 0934 Pets and related products; .0935 veterinary and other services for pets 1232 Other personal effects	0.282  0.554 0.293 0.261 0.654 0.425

**Note:** \*We use the annual weights for each COICOP/HICP item from 2000 to 2014 published by Eurostat. To save space, we only report here the last available weights (2014 HICP basket).